Abstract-In this paper, we propose a scheme, called the algebraic watchdog for wireless network coding, in which nodes can detect malicious behaviors probabilistically, police their downstream neighbors locally using overheard messages, and, thus, provide a secure global self-checking network. Unlike traditional Byzantine detection protocols which are receiver-based, this protocol gives the senders an active role in checking the node downstream. This work is inspired by Marti et al.'s watchdogpathrater, which attempts to detect and mitigate the effects of routing misbehavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been numerous contributions to secure wireless networks, including key management, secure routing, Byzantine detection, and various protocol designs (for a general survey on this topic, see [1] ). We focus on Byzantine detection. The traditional approach is receiver-based -i.e. the receiver of the corrupted data detects the presence of an upstream adversary. However, this detection may come too late as the adversary is partially successful in disrupting the network (even if it is detected). It has wasted network bandwidth, while the source is still unaware of the need for retransmission.
Reference [2] introduces a protocol for routing wireless networks, called the watchdog and pathrater, in which upstream nodes police their downstream neighbors using promiscuous monitoring. Promiscuous monitoring means that if a node A is within range of a node B, it can overhear communication This material is based upon work under a subcontract #069145 issued by BAE Systems National Security Solutions, Inc. and supported by the DARPA and the Space and Naval Warfare System Center, San Diego under Contract No. N66001-08-C-2013.
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to and from B even if those communication do not directly involve A. This scheme successfully detects adversaries and removes misbehaving nodes from the network by dynamically adjusting the routing paths. However, the protocol requires a significant overhead (12% to 24%) owing to increased control traffic and numerous cryptographic messages. Our goal is to design/analyze a watchdog-inspired protocol for wireless networks using network coding. Network coding [3] [4] is advantageous as it not only increases throughput and robustness against failures and erasures but also it is resilient in dynamic/unstable networks where state information may change rapidly or may be hard to obtain. Taking advantage of the wireless setting, we propose a scheme for coded networks, in which nodes can verify probabilistically, and police their neighbors locally using promiscuous monitoring. Our ultimate goal is a robust self-checking network. In this paper, we present the first building block of a such system, and analyze the algebraic watchdog protocol for a two-hop network.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the background and related material. In Section III, we introduce our problem statement and network model. In Section IV, we analyze the protocol for a simple two-hop network, first algebraically in Section IV-B and then graphically in Section IV-A. In Section V, we summarize our contribution and discuss some future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS

A. Secure Network Coding
Network coding, first introduced in [3] , allows algebraic mixing of information in the intermediate nodes. This mixing has been shown to have numerous performance benefits. It is known that network coding maximizes throughput [3] , as well as robustness against failures [4] and erasures [5] . However, a major concern for network coding system is its vulnerability to Byzantine adversaries. A single corrupted packet generated by a Byzantine adversary can contaminate all the information to a destination, and propagate to other destinations quickly. For example, in random linear network coding [5] , one corrupted packet in a generation (i.e. a fixed set of packets) can prevent a receiver from decoding any data from that generation even if all the other packets it has received are valid.
There are several papers that attempt to address this problem. One approach is to correct the errors injected by the Byzantine adversaries using network error correction [6] . They bound the maximum achievable rate in an adversarial setting, and generalizes the Hamming, Gilbert-Varshamov, and Singleton bounds. Jaggi et al. [7] propose a distributed, rate-optimal, network coding scheme for multicast network that is resilient in the presence of Byzantine adversaries for sufficiently large field and packet size. Reference [8] generalizes [7] to provide correction guarantees against adversarial errors for any given field and packet size. In [9] , Kim et al.compare the cost and benefit associated with these Byzantine detection schemes in terms of transmitted bits by allowing nodes to employ the detection schemes to drop polluted data.
B. Secure Routing Protocol: Watchdog and Pathrater
The problem of securing networks in the presence of Byzantine adversaries has been studied extensively, e.g. [10] , [11] , [12] . The watchdog and pathrater [2] are two extensions to the Dynamic Source Routing [13] protocol that attempt to detect and mitigate the effects of routing misbehavior. The watchdog detects misbehavior based on promiscuous monitoring of the transmissions of the downstream node to confirm if this relay correctly forwards the packets it receives. If a node bound to forward a packet fails to do so after a certain period of time, the watchdog increments a failure rating for that node and a node is deemed to be misbehaving when this failure rating exceeds a certain threshold. The pathrater then uses the gathered information to determine the best possible routes by avoiding misbehaving nodes. This mechanism, which does not punish these nodes (it actually relieves them from forwarding operations), provides an increase in the throughput of networks with misbehaving nodes.
C. Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis testing is a method of deciding which of the two hypotheses, denoted H 0 and H 1 , is true, given an observation denoted as U . In this paper, H 0 is the hypothesis that R is wellbehaving, H 1 is that R is malicious, and U is the information gathered from overhearing. The observation U is distributed differently depending whether H 0 or H 1 is true, and these distributions are denoted as P U|H0 and P U|H1 respectively.
An algorithm is used to choose between the hypotheses given the observation U . There are two types of error associated with the decision process:
• Type 1 error, False detection: Accepting H 1 when H 0 is true (i.e. considering a well-behaving R to be malicious), and the probability of this event is denoted γ.
• Type 2 error, Misdetection: Accepting H 0 when H 1 is true (i.e. considering a malicious R to be well-behaving), and the probability of this event is denoted β.
The Neyman-Pearson theorem gives the optimal decision rule that given the maximal tolerable β, we can minimize γ by accepting hypothesis H 0 if and only if log
≥ t for some threshold t dependant on γ. For more thorough survey on hypothesis testing in the context of authentication, see [14] .
D. Notations and definitions
We shall use elements from a field, and their bitrepresentation. To avoid confusion, we use the same character in italic font (i.e. x) for the field element, and in bold font (i.e. x) for the bit-representation. We use underscore bold font (i.e. x) for vectors. For arithmetic operations in the field, we shall use the conventional notation (i.e. +, −, ·). For bit-operation, we shall use ⊕ for addition, and ⊗ for multiplication.
We also require polynomial hash functions defined as follows (for a more detailed discussion on this topic, see [15] ).
Definition 1 (Polynomial hash functions): For a finite field F and d ≥ 1, the class of polynomial hash functions on F is defined as follows:
where
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We model a wireless network with a hypergraph G = (V, E 1 , E 2 ), where V is the set of the nodes in the network, E 1 is the set of hyperedges representing the connectivity (wireless links), and E 2 is the set of hyperedges representing the interference. We use the hypergraph to capture the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. If (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ E 1 and (v 1 , v 3 ) ∈ E 2 where v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ∈ V , then there is an intended transmission from v 1 to v 2 , and v 3 can overhear this transmission (possibly incorrectly). There is a certain transition probability associated with the interference channels known to the nodes, and we model them with binary channels.
A node v i ∈ V transmits coded information x i by transmitting a packet p i , where
• a i corresponds to the coding coefficients α j , j ∈ I i , where I i ⊆ V is the set of nodes adjacent to
We assume that the hash function used, h(·), is known to all nodes, including the adversary. In addition, we assume that a i , h I i and h x i are part of the header information, and are sufficiently coded to allow the nodes to correctly receive them even under noisy channel conditions. Therefore, if a node overhears the transmission of p i , it may not be able to correctly receive x i , but it receives α j and h(x j ) for v j ∈ I i , and h(x i ). Protecting the header sufficiently will of course induce some overhead, but the assumption remains a reasonable one to make. First, the header is smaller than the message itself. Second, even in the routing case, the header and the state information must to be coded sufficiently. Third, the hashes
does not need to repeat h I i , thus sending only h x i . Therefore, the overhead associated with the hashes is proportional to the in-degree of a node, and does not accumulate with the routing path length. Fig. 1. A valid 
Our goal is to explore an approach to detect and prevent malicious behaviors in wireless networks using network coding. The scheme takes advantage of the wireless setting, where neighbors can overhear others' transmissions albeit with some noise, to verify probabilistically that the next node in the path is behaving given the overheard transmissions. Therefore, we take advantage of the wireless setting, in which nodes can overhear their neighbors' transmissions. In Figure 2 , we use the solid lines to represent the intended channels E 1 , and dotted lines for the interference channels E 2 which we model with binary channels as mentioned in Section III. Each node checks whether its neighbors are transmitting values that are consistent with the gathered information. If a node detects that its neighbor is misbehaving, then it can alert other nodes in the network and isolate the misbehaving node.
As outlined in Section II-C, we denote the hypothesis that R is well-behaving by H 0 , and H 1 corresponds to that of a malicious R. In the next subsections, we shall use an example with m = 2, as shown Figure 3 , to introduce the graphical model which explains how a node v i checks its neighbor's behavior. Then, we use an algebraic approach to analyze/compute γ and β for this example network.
A. Graphical model approach
In this section, we present a graphical approach to model this problem systematically, and to explain how a node may check its neighbors. This approach may be advantageous as it lends easily to already existing graphical model algorithms as well as some approximation algorithms.
We shall consider the problem from v 1 's perspective. As shown in Figure 4 which is the probability that the inference channel outputs message v given an input message w. This graphical model illustrates sequentially and visually the inference process v 1 executes. In addition, the graphical approach may be extend to larger networks. Cascading multiple copies of the graphical model may allow us to systematically model larger networks with multiple hops as well as m ≥ 3.
(Note that when m increases, the graphical model changes into a family of graphs; while when n increases, the size of each Layer increases.) Furthermore, by using approximation algorithms and pruning algorithms, we may be able to simplify the computation as well as the structure of the graph.
B. Algebraic approach
Consider v 1 . By assumption, v 1 correctly receives a 2 , a 3 , h I2 , h I3 , h x2 , and h x3 . In addition, v 1 receivesx 2 = x 2 + e ′ andx 3 = x 3 + e ′′ , where e ′ and e ′′ are outcomes of the interference channels. Givenx j for j = {2, 3} and the transition probabilities, v 1 computes r j→1 such that the sum of the probability that the interference channel from v j and v 1 outputsx j given x ∈ B(x j , r j→1 ) is greater or equal to 1 − ǫ where ǫ is a constant, and B(x, r) is a n-dimensional ball of radius r centered at x. Now,
Then, v 1 intersectsX 3 and the computed α 1 x 1 + α 2x 's. If the intersection is empty, then v 1 claims that R is misbehaving.
We explain the inference process described above using the graphical model introduced in Section IV-A. The set {x | h(x) = h(x 2 )} represents the Layer 2 vertices reachable from the starting point ([x 2 , h(x 2 )] in Layer 1), andX 2 is a subset of the reachable Layer 2 vertices such that the total edge weight (which corresponds to the transition probability) from the starting point is greater than 1−ǫ. Then, computing α 1 x 1 + α 2x represents the permutation from Layers 2 to 3. Finally, the intersection withX 3 represents finding a set of Layer 3 vertices such that they are adjacent to the destination point ([x 3 , h(x 3 ) ] in Layer 4) and their total transition probability to the destination point is greater than 1 − ǫ.
Note that a malicious v 3 would not inject errors in h x3 only, because the destination v 4 can easily verify if h x3 is equal to h(x 3 ). Therefore, h x3 and x 3 are consistent. In addition, v 3 would not inject errors in h x j , j ∈ I 3 , as each node v j can verify the hash of its message. On the other hand, a malicious v 3 can inject errors in a 3 , forcing v 4 to receive incorrect coefficientsα j 's instead of α j 's. However, any error introduced in a 3 can be translated to errors in x 3 by assuming thatα j 's are the correct coding coefficients. Therefore, we are concerned only with the case in which v 3 introduces errors in x 3 (and therefore, in h x3 such that h x3 = h(x 3 )).
Lemma 4.1: For n sufficiently large, the probability of false detection, γ ≤ ǫ for any arbitrary small constant ǫ.
Proof: Assume that v 3 is not malicious, and transmits x 3 and h x3 consistent with v 4 's check. Then, for n sufficiently large, v 1 can choose r 2→1 and r 3→1 such that the probability that the bit representation of x 3 = α 1 x 1 + α 2 x 2 is inX 3 and the probability that x 2 ∈X 2 are greater than 1 − ǫ. Therefore, X 3 ∩ {α 1 x 1 + α 2x | ∀x ∈X 2 } = ∅ with probability arbitrary close to 1. Therefore, a well-behaving v 3 passes v 1 's check with probability at least 1 − ǫ. Thus, γ ≤ ǫ.
Lemma 4.2: P(A malicious v 3 is undetected from v 1 's perspective) is:
Proof: Assume that v 3 is malicious and injects errors into x 3 . Consider an element z ∈X 3 , where z = α 1 x 1 + α 2 x 2 + e = α 1 x 1 + α 2 (x 2 + e 2 ) for some e and e 2 . Note that, since we are using a field of size 2 n , multiplying an element from the field by a randomly chosen constant has the effect of randomizing the product. Here, we consider two cases:
however, v 3 is unlikely to pass v 2 's check. This is because α 1 x 1 + α 2 (x 2 + e 2 ) = α 1 x 1 + α 2 x 2 + α 2 e 2 = α 1 (x 1 + e 1 ) + α 2 x 2 for some e 1 . Here, for uniformly random α 1 and α 2 , e 1 is also uniformly random. Therefore, the probability that v 3 will pass is the probability that the uniformly random vector x 1 + e 1 belongs toX 1 = {x | h(x) = h(x 1 )}∩B(x 1 , r 1→2 ) where v 2 overhearsx 1 from v 1 , and the probability that the interference channel from v 1 to v 2 outputsx 1 given x ∈ B(x 1 , r 1→2 ) is greater than 1 − ǫ.
2 n , where V ol(·) is equal to the number of {0, 1}-vectors in the given set. Since V ol(B(x, r)) = r k=0 n k ≤ 2 n , and the probability that h(x) is equal to a given value is 1 2 h , V ol(X 1 ) is given as follows:
From v 1 's perspective, the probability that a z ∈X 3 passes the checks, P(z passes check), is:
Similarly, P(x 2 + e 2 ∈X 2 ) =
. Then, the probability that v 3 is undetected from v 1 's perspective is the probability that at least one z ∈X 3 passes the check: P(A malicious v 3 is undetected from v 1 's perspective) = min{1, P(z passes check) · V ol(X 3 )} Note that P(z passes check) · V ol(X 3 ) is the expected number of z ∈X 3 that passes the check; thus, given a high enough P(z passes check), would exceed 1. Therefore, we take min{1, P(z passes check) · V ol(X 3 )} to get a valid probability. This proves the statement.
Lemma 4.3: P(A malicious v 3 is undetected from v 2 's perspective) is:
where v 2 overhearsx 3 from v 3 , and the probability that the interference channel from v 3 to v 2 outputsx 3 given x ∈ B(x 3 , r 3→2 ) is greater than 1 − ǫ.
Proof: By similar analysis as in proof of Lemma 4.2. Theorem 4.4: The probability of misdetection, β, is: where r = min{r 3→1 , r 3→2 }. Proof: The probability of misdetection is the minimum of the probability that v 1 and v 2 misdetecting malicious v 3 . Therefore, by Lemma 4.2 and 4.3, the statement is true. Theorem 4.4 shows that the probability of misdetection β decreases with the hash size, as the hashes restrict the space of consistent codewords. In addition, since r 1→2 , r 2→1 , r 3→1 , and r 3→2 represent the uncertainty introduced by the interference channels, β increases with them. Lastly and the most interestingly, β decreases with n, since r k=0 n k < 2 n for r < n. This is because network coding randomizes the messages over a field whose size is increasing exponentially with n, and this makes it difficult for an adversary to introduce errors without introducing inconsistencies.
Note that we can apply Theorem 4.4 even when v 1 and v 2 cannot overhear each other. In this case, both r 1→2 and r 2→1 equal to n, giving the probability of misdetection, β = min{1, r k=0 n k /8 h } where r = min{r 3→1 , r 3→2 }. Here, β highly depends on h, the size of the hash, as v 1 and v 2 are only using their own message and the overheard hashes.
The algebraic approach results in a nice analysis with exact formulae for γ and β. In addition, these formulae are conditional probabilities; as a result, they hold regardless of a priori knowledge of whether v 3 is malicious or not. However, this approach is not very extensible as the number of "reasonable" messages grows exponentially with m.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
